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A NOTE ON FIRST-ORDER ARITHMETIC
STEPHEN BOYCE
Abstract. This paper describes a system S′ obtained by modifying first-order
arithmetic S to ’parameterise’ the individual variables so that under any inter-
pretation of S′, the individual variables range over all and only the individuals
assigned to the numerals under this interpretation. Since S′ contains Peano
arithmetic and is recursively axiomatised we can modify Go¨del’s technique to
define a Go¨del sentence for S′, say (∀x)R(x). S′ may be shown to be inconsis-
tent since (∀x)R(x) must be an S′ theorem. Since the syntax of S′ and S are
identical however the inconsistency of S itself is implied by this result.
1. Introduction
This paper describes a system S′ obtained by modifying first-order arithmetic to
’parameterise’ the individual variables so that under any interpretation of S′, the
individual variables range over all and only the individuals assigned to the numerals
under this interpretation. Since S′ contains Peano arithmetic and is recursively
axiomatised we can modify Go¨del’s technique to define a Go¨del sentence for S′,
say (∀x)R(x). S′ may be shown to be inconsistent since (∀x)R(x) must be an S′
theorem. Since the syntax of S′ and S are identical however the inconsistency of S
itself is implied by this result.
Unless otherwise indicated, when the ’completeness’ of a first-order theory is
mentioned herein it is the semantic completeness of the theory that is referred
to. This point, together with some comments on the notation / symbolism of this
paper, are briefly discussed in the following subsection, which most readers should
nevertheless be able to skip without loss.
1.1. A digression on notation and terminology. To avoid confusion between
use of a formula (under some interpretation) and mention of the formula (viewed
as an uninterpreted sequence of signs) I primarily rely on the intelligence of the
reader though I sometimes use quotation symbols. While use of corners for quasi-
quotation would improve precision in some contexts I generally refrain from this so
that confusion will not arise with use of corners below for the ’encoding’ of some S
or S′ expression within S or S′; that is, if Bn(xin) is associated with the number n,
then pBn(xin )q is the numeral n. For informal metalinguistic reasoning I generally
use ’∨’, ’A’, ’&’, ’←’, ’↔’, ’(Ey)’, ’(x)’, {x|F (x)} for (respectively): disjunction,
negation, conjunction, the (material or formal) conditional, the (material or formal)
biconditional, existential and universal quantification, and ’the class of objects x
such that F (x) holds’; in discussing the arithmetisation of the syntax of S or S′
I sometimes however follow [2] and use the symbolism of the object language to
facilitate comparison with material drawn from [2]. The following section describes
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the system of interest S′. In the interest of brevity the following definitions are
used:
Semantic completeness: A formal theory T is semantically complete if ev-
ery well-formed formula of T that is logically valid is a T -theorem (formally
provable within T using T ’s axioms and rules of inference).
Propositional completeness: A formal theory T exhibits propositional com-
pleteness if, for the interpretation M of interest, every (well-formed) sen-
tential formula B of T is either: (1) a T -theorem or formally refutable
within T or (2) there exists a second sentential formula C of T such that
both the following hold: (i) C is either a T -theorem or formally refutable
within T and (ii) C is assigned the same ’meaning’ as B under M.
Syntactic completeness: A formal theory T is syntactically complete if ev-
ery (well-formed) sentential formula B of T is either a T -theorem or for-
mally refutable within T .
While the notion of propositional completeness is not used in this paper, I note
that it is useful in considering the significance of Go¨del’s incompleteness results;
without this notion, it is difficult to state succinctly that the results raise the ques-
tion of whether the syntactical incompleteness of the systems implies propositional
incompleteness. The following section describes the system of interest S′.
2. The system S′
For brevity I assume familiarity with Mendelson’s first order number theory S
[2]; my description of S′ will accordingly be somewhat terse (to improve readability
I use ’0’ instead of the official S numeral for zero ’a1’). As should be clear from the
definition below, the notion of a ’first-order language’ used throughout is strictly
speaking a notion of a first-order language in an extended sense - in this extended
sense, a first-order language may contain, an addition to the individual constants,
’parameterised variables’ rather than the variables that are primitive symbols of
first-order languages in the restricted sense ([2]- §2.2). Since parameterised vari-
ables are neither constants, nor predicate nor function symbols, their addition to
the language of S does not imply the need for a revision of the general notion
of an interpretation of a first-order language ([2]- §2.2). It does however require
a modification in the definition of the function s∗ used to specify whether a well
formed formula B is ’satisfied’ at a particular sequence of objects in D. (s∗ assigns
an individual d in the domain of an interpretation M to each term of a first order
language L.)
Definition 1. S′ is the system that results from Mendelson’s S when the the defi-
nition of the function s∗ is modified to parameterise the individual variables (’x1’,
. . ., ’xn’, . . .) so that under any interpretation these ranges over all and only the
individuals assigned to the numerals:
(1) The symbols, formation and inference rules, and logical and proper axioms
of S′ are the same as those for S;
(2) (Definition of s′∗) For any interpretation M of S′ the function s′∗ is equal
to the corresponding function s∗ defined for S at M except that where ’xi’
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is any variable the following rule is adopted (c.f. [2]: §2.2):
(2.1) s′∗(xi) =
{
si if for some numeral n: si = s
∗(n)
s∗(0) otherwise
For brevity, I will speak of any interpretation of the language of S as being
identical with the corresponding interpretation of the language of S′ (see Proposition
2). For the proof that S′ is inconsistent four metatheorems concerning the system
are used, the first of which is the following:
Proposition 1. The formation and inference rules of S′ are (primitive) recursive
in Go¨del’s sense ([1]: 610); that is, once ’we replace the primitive signs in some
way by natural numbers’.
Proof Sketch. For a full proof of Proposition 1 an explicit arithmetisation of the
syntax of S′ must be exhibited. Since the syntax of S′ and S are identical however,
Mendelson’s existing arithmetisation of the syntax of S ([2]: §3.4) demonstrates
that S′ is primitive recursive. 
I turn now to the second metatheoretical proposition regarding S′ required for
the proof that S′ is inconsistent which is this:
Proposition 2. The metatheory of an arbitrary first order theory K presented in
[2]: Chapter Two can be shown, by the arguments presented therein, to hold for S′
as well; in particular, the demonstrations imply that:
(1) The notions of ’truth’, ’falsity’, and ’satisfaction’ of an S′ formula under an
interpretation yield the expected properties when applied to S′, i.e. Proposi-
tions I-XI [2] §2.2 hold for S′ provided they hold for an arbitrary first order
theory K;
(2) S′ is semantically complete ([2] Corollary 2.18) and a wff B ’is true in every
denumerable model’ of S′ if and only if ⊢S′ B ([2] Corollary 2.20a).
Proof. As the syntax of S and S′ are identical it is sufficient to establish that the
key semantic metatheorems (Propositions I-XI [2] §2.2) - concerning the proper-
ties of the notions ’truth’, ’falsity’ and ’satisfaction’ of an S′ formula(s) under an
interpretation - hold for S′ if they hold for an arbitrary first order theory K. To
establish this proposition some notation is useful. Let B be any S′ formula (hence
also an S formula); let F(i,B,M) be the metatheoretical proposition that Propo-
sition i holds for B under the interpretation M. For example, if M is the standard
interpretation then F(1a, (0 = 0),M) is the claim that (0 = 0) is false for this
interpretation if and only if ¬(0 = 0) is true for this interpretation. Similarly, let
G(i) be the metatheoretical proposition that Proposition i holds for every S formula
under every interpretation and H(i,B,M) be the metatheoretical proposition that
Proposition i holds for the S formula B under an S interpretation M. Proposition 2
holds since:
Lemma 1. For each of the indexed metatheoretical propositions i and every inter-
pretation M, for any S′ formula B there exists an S interpretation M′ such that:
G(i)→ H(i,B,M ′)→ F(i,B,M)(2.2)
The proof by contradiction of Lemma 1 is straightforward. Suppose that the ith
semantic metatheorem fails for an S′ formula for the interpretation M. Let the S
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interpretation M′ be chosen as follows. The domain D′ of M′ shall be the smallest
subset of D that includes (0)M that is closed with respect to the relation (f11 )
m;
let (f11 )
m
′
, (f21 )
m
′
and (f22 )
m
′
be (f11 )
m restricted to D′, (f21 )
m restricted to D′ and
(f22 )
m restricted to D′ respectively; finally, let (A21)
m
′
be (A21)
m restricted to D′.
Then the hypothesis F(i,B,M) implies H(i,B,M ′) as required. 
The third metatheoretical proposition regarding S′ required for the proof that
S′ is inconsistent is this:
Corollary 1. S′ contains Peano arithmetic in the sense that every recursive func-
tion (or relation) is representable (expressible) in S′.
Proof. By Proposition 3.24 and Corollary 3.25 respectively ([2]: §3.3): every recur-
sive function (relation) is representable (respectively, expressible) in S. Since the
syntax of S and S′ is identical S, every S theorem is an S′ theorem. Thus S′ also
contains Peano arithmetic in this sense. 
The final metatheorem required to establish the inconsistency of S′ is that the
system contains a Go¨del sentence, say (∀x)R. The existence of such a sentence
follows from the fact that S′ is recursively axiomatised and (essentially) contains
Peano arithmetic ([1] Theorem VI). The following section provides a summary
of one method of defining this formula. The reader familiar with any standard
presentation of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem may skim or skip this section.
3. A Go¨del sentence for S′
In defining a Go¨del sentence for S′ I follow Go¨del’s original approach, rather than
using the diagonalisation Lemma ([2] §3.5), to facilitate comparison with the former
source. In this section, all the the symbols for (arithmetised) metamathematical
functions / relations (’Gd’ etc) should, unless otherwise stated, have subscripts
indicating that it is the function / relation for S′ that is used or mentioned (e.g.
’PfS′ ’)
Lemma 2. If S′ is consistent then there exists an S′ formula R, with the free
variable ’ x1 ’, such that:
(1) 0S′ (∀x1)R and
(2) For any S′ numeral n: ⊢S′ R(n) .
Proof. Adapting [1], let Q be the relation of numbers such that (where Neg , Num ,
Pf , and Sub are the primitive recursive number theoretic functions / relations
defined at [2] § 3.4):
(3.1) Q(x, y) ↔ Pf{x, Sub[y,Num(y), 21]}
As the relation Q may be shown to be (primitive) recursive, there exists (by Corol-
lary 1 and [2] Corollary 3.25) an S′ formula Q (associated via the arithmetisation
function g with a number q) with the free variables ’x1’, ’x2’, such that, for all
2-tuples of natural numbers (x, y) :
Pf{x, Sub[y,Num(y), 21]} → ⊢S′ Q(x, y)(3.2)
Pf{x, Sub[y,Num(y), 21]} → ⊢S′ ¬Q(x, y)(3.3)
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Let p be the number associated via the arithmetisation function g with the S′
formula (∀x1)Q. Put
r = Sub[q,Num(p), 29](3.4)
Hence : g[(∀x1)R] = Sub[p,Num(p), 29](3.5)
Using the definitions provided, Lemma 2 is equivalent to the proposition that, if S′
is consistent then:
(x)(Eu)Pf{u, Sub[r,Num(x), 21]}(3.6)
(Eu)Pf{u, Sub[p,Num(p), 29]}(3.7)
This follows from the proof of [1] Theorem VI:
(1) If S′ is consistent, then (Eu)Pf{u, Sub[p,Num(p), 29]} . Otherwise for some
natural number x, Pf{x, Sub[p,Num(p), 29]} yields:
(a) From 3.3: ⊢S′ ¬Q(x, p) hence (in view of 3.4): ⊢S′ ¬R(x)
(b) From 3.5: ⊢S′ (∀x1)R hence ⊢S′ R(x)
(2) If S′ is consistent, then (x)(Eu)Pf{u, Sub[r,Num(x), 21]}) since:
(a) From the generalisation of 3.2 and the definition of r:
(x)(Pf{x, Sub[p,Num(p), 29]} →(3.8)
(Eu)Pf{u, Sub[r,Num(x), 21]})
(b) 3.8, and an instance of the first-order theorem ( (x)[F (x) → G(x)] →
[(x)F (x) → (x)G(x)] ) yield (via MP):
(x)Pf{x, Sub[p,Num(p), 29]} →(3.9)
(x)(Eu)Pf{u, Sub[r,Num(x), 21]}
(c) 3.6 thus follows from 3.7 and 3.9 via MP.

If (∀x)R is a Go¨del sentence for S′ then it can also be shown that, if S′ is ω-
consistent then 0S′ (∃x)¬R ([2] Proposition 3.37); this proposition is not required
for what follows however. The following section shows that the above implies that
S′ is inconsistent and moreover that the standard interpretation is not a model of
S.
4. A proof that S is not consistent
As a preliminary step to the main result of this paper I firstly show that:
Proposition 3. S′ is inconsistent
Proof. (1) By the completeness of S′ ([2] Corollary 2.20a), there must be a
(non-standard) denumerable models of S′, say M, such that |=M ¬[(∀x)R].
For otherwise, (∀x)R would be true in every denumerable model and hence
by the completeness of S′ we would have ⊢S′ (∀x)R, contradicting the
hypothesis that S′ is consistent (Lemma 2).
(2) Let M then be a denumerable model of S′ such that |=M ¬[(∀x)R] holds; it
may be seen as follows that this implies the contradiction that |=M (∀x)R
also holds:
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(a) By the proof of Lemma 2, the consistency of S′ implies that, for every
numeral n we have ⊢S′ R(n) hence |=M R(n) . But since the range
of x is restricted to the objects in the domain that are named by the
numerals, this implies that |=M (∀x)R holds.
(3) To avoid the contradiction that ¬[(∀x)R] and (∀x)R are both true for some
model M we must thus conclude that (∀x)R holds for all denumerable
models of S′; hence by the completeness of S′ it is an S′ theorem and thus
S′ is inconsistent.

Since the syntax of S and S′ are identical, we have as a consequence of Proposition
3:
Corollary 2. S is not consistent
I turn now to a brief discussion of the significance of these results.
5. Conclusions
For brevity I will assume, as appears to be true, that the above proof only
exploits features of S that are common to any orthodox, formalist account of first-
order number theory. If one assumes that the metatheory of such systems is free
from paradox then the result is genuinely puzzling; from this perspective, it appears
obvious that all of the logical and proper axioms of S are true under the standard
interpretation and the inference rules preserve truth under an interpretation. The
conclusion provides strong support for the claim that the metatheory is subject to
paradox and that formalism thus fails to provide an adequate account of classical
mathematics.
The idea that the metatheory is subject to paradox might be paraphrased as
follows: when the informal metatheory of formalist first-order arithmetic is made
precise a genuine contradiction arises. This does not imply that a certain contradic-
tion is true; on the contrary, if the above proof is examined, it is clear that the law
of contradiction is relied on in the informal metatheory at certain points. It would
be confused or dishonest to suggest that the law of contradiction can be denied
and the above proof simultaneously affirmed. The implication is rather that the
devices that formalists rely on for the avoidance of paradox are not adequate to the
task. On this view, the intuitions that underly the formalist theory of arithmetic
are false in the sense that: given any statement of this view, some of the sentences
involved are ’meaningless’ / do not express a proposition.
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